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I. INTRODUCTION
The drafters of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 19941 sought to mitigate the effects of harsh
mandatory minimum sentences for defendants who play minor roles in
1. Later codified in the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 (2002) [hereinafter
2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (setting "forth the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) as added by
section 80001(a) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994").
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nonviolent drug crimes by creating a "safety valve" provision. 2 This
provision offers first-time offenders a way out of mandatory minimum
sentences based on their minor participation in drug-related federal
crimes.3 Typically, these first-time offenders are "mules," people asked
or hired by drug dealers to transport drugs.4 According to the
provision, defendants are eligible for relief if, among other
requirements, 5 they "truthfully provid[e] to the government all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense."
6
As an illustration of how the safety valve provision works,
consider a hypothetical case. Bob is approached by Marty, who gives
Bob a bag and asks Bob to deliver it to a third party. The police stop
Bob and find five kilos of cocaine in the bag. At trial, Bob pleads guilty
and is convicted of possession with intent to distribute. 7 This amount
of cocaine carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. Before
2. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 80001,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553). Sections 80001, 3553(f), and 5C1.2 are known
collectively as the "safety valve provision."
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000).
4. United States v. Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that "lower-level offenders, such as drug
couriers or 'mules,'. . . typically have less [criminal] knowledge").
5. § 3553(f) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of an offense under section
401, 404, or 406 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§§] 841, 844, 846) or
section 1010 or 1013 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C.
[§§] 960, 963), the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated
by the United States Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28 without
regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds at sentencing, after the
government has been afforded the opportunity to make a recommendation, that-
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined
under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a
firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in
connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the
offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a
continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances
Act, and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully
provided to the government all information and evidence the defendant has
concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a
common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful
other information to provide or that the government is already aware of the
information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has
not complied with this requirement.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(o (emphasis added).
6. 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5C1.2(a)(5).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000) (prohibiting possession with intent to distribute).
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the sentencing hearing, Bob meets with the prosecutor, who asks Bob
the name of the person who gave him the bag. Bob suffers from
extreme short-term memory loss and is unable to provide Marty's
name to the prosecution. At the sentencing hearing, Bob can obtain
relief from the mandatory minimum sentence if he can show that he
meets the five requirements of the safety valve provision. 8 To qualify
for relief, Bob must show (1) that he is a first-time offender according
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("the Guidelines"), (2) that he
did not use violence in the commission of the crime, (3) that no one
was hurt by Bob's actions, (4) that Bob was a mere participant in the
criminal activity, rather than an organizer, and (5) that Bob has
truthfully provided the government with all of the information that he
has regarding the offense. 9 To prove the fifth requirement, Bob's
attorney pays a psychiatrist to testify at the sentencing hearing
regarding Bob's condition. To grant Bob safety valve relief, the judge
will have to evaluate the psychiatrist's testimony and decide whether
he believes that Bob has met the fifth requirement of truthfulness by
providing all the information he has.'0
The safety valve provision was enacted ten years after the
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, which created mandatory
minimum sentences for many drug and firearm offenses in addition to
establishing the Federal Sentencing Commission to ensure uniformity
in federal sentencing." The purpose of the safety valve was to ensure
that first-time, nonviolent offenders were not unduly punished by
mandatory minimum sentences that were meant to apply to more
culpable defendants with extensive criminal histories. 12
After the defendant presents his case, and the prosecution
raises any objections, the court has discretion to determine whether or
not the defendant has provided all the information he has, based on
the evidence presented at sentencing (or trial) and any additional
evidence presented to the court. 13 Since the enactment of the safety
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
9. See § 3553(f). The defendant has the burden of satisfying these requirements by a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1996).
10. Although application of the safety valve is apparently mandatory if a defendant meets
the five stated criteria, there is room for substantial judicial discretion in determining whether
the criteria have been met. See, e.g., United States v. Espinosa, 172 F.3d 795, 797 (11th Cir.
1999) (holding that the court bears the responsibility of determining the truthfulness of the
information the defendant provides to the government); United States v. Gama-Bastidas, 142
F.3d 1233, 1242 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the court must determine the quality and
completeness of all information the defendant provided to the government to satisfy the fifth
subsection).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 25-27.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
13. See § 3553(f).
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valve provision, codified in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as Rule
5C1.2, most of the related litigation has focused on the fifth
requirement, that a defendant "truthfully provide.., all
information... [he] has" in order to qualify for safety valve relief.
14
The defendant carries the burden of proof as to the five criteria.15
An issue at the heart of the safety valve's purpose is whether or
not the information a defendant provides to the government must be
objectively truthful, or whether the truthfulness requirement is
satisfied when a defendant provides all the information that he
subjectively believes to be truthful, even though that information may
be contrary to facts offered by the government. The federal circuits are
divided as to the standard of truthfulness required for safety valve
relief.16 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits and, prior to United States v.
Reynoso, the Second Circuit, termed the safety valve a "good faith"
test and used a flexible approach to determine truthfulness, based on
whether a defendant has "provided ... all information ... [she] has."
17
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit determined that a defendant may
qualify for safety valve relief based on psychological testimony at the
sentencing hearing, if the information a defendant provides is true
"within the range of her ability."18 However, a recent Second Circuit
decision declined to follow this standard, holding that the information
a defendant provides must be objectively truthful for a defendant to
qualify for safety valve relief.19 In United States v. Reynoso, the
Second Circuit held that even when a defendant had provided all of
14. 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5C1.2(a)(5) and accompanying text.
Because the first four requirements are clearly defined and based on concrete facts, it is
relatively easy to determine whether or not a defendant meets them. The fifth requirement,
however, requires a specific and unique determination by the presiding judge and is therefore
the subject of most of the litigation surrounding the safety valve. See id.
15. See supra note 5.
16. Compare United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 166, 171 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing safety
valve relief based on expert testimony offered by the defendant at the sentencing hearing
tending to show limitations on Thompson's perceptual and analytical abilities and concluding
that Thompson had been forthright within the range of her abilities), with United States v.
Reynoso, 239 F.3d 143, 145-46, 150 (2d Cir. 2000) (denying safety valve relief based on similar
facts when both the government and court accepted arguendo that the defendant had given all of
the information she had, within the range of her abilities).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (2000); see United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir.
1999) (emphasizing that the statute requires a defendant to act in "good faith") (citation
omitted); United States v. Ryals, Nos. 95-6202/95-6203, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13127, at *11 (6th
Cir. June 2, 1997) (finding that § 3553(f) provides that statutorily mandatory minimum
sentences should not apply to drug offenders who have "made a good-faith effort to cooperate
with the government"); United States v. Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105, 1110 (2d Cir. 1997) (indicating
that a defendant must make a "good faith attempt to cooperate with the authorities" (quoting
United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1996))); Thompson, 76 F.3d at 171.
18. See Thompson, 76 F.3d at 171.
19. See Reynoso, 239 F.3d at 146.
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the information that she believed to be true, she did not qualify for
safety valve relief because the information that she provided was not
objectively truthful as determined by the court.
20
This Note argues that the additional requirement of objective
truthfulness transforms the safety valve into a modified version of the
"substantial assistance" departure, 21 which allows more culpable
defendants to obtain lesser sentences based on the quality and
quantity of the information they provide to the government. 22 As such,
the Second Circuit's interpretation is contrary to congressional intent
regarding the enactment of the safety valve: the safety valve was
specifically enacted to aid less culpable defendants who have little or
no new information to trade. This Note seeks to demonstrate that the
Seventh Circuit's approach is correct and that the standard of
truthfulness used to determine whether or not a defendant qualifies
for safety valve relief should be based on the information that a
defendant is able to provide in accordance with the language and
purpose of the Act. The Second Circuit decision in Reynoso
reinterprets the language of the safety valve by requiring that a
defendant not only "truthfully provide" all information he has, but also
prove that the information provided is objectively true.23
As a result of varying circuit court interpretations of the
truthfulness requirement, different courts have granted and denied
safety valve relief to defendants with similar minor roles in drug
crimes based on the reviewing courts' interpretation of the type of
information that the defendant is required to provide. 24 This Note
therefore further argues that the Reynoso decision decreases the
uniformity in the application of the safety valve and increases the
already considerable discretion allowed sentencing judges in
determining whether or not similarly situated offenders qualify for
relief.25 Under this interpretation, the safety valve can be understood
functionally as another tool for judges to use in their increasingly
discretionary roles as sentencers, despite Congress's efforts to
standardize sentences by creating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
20. See id. at 150.
21. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5K1.1.
22. Id. The substantial assistance departure provides that "[u]pon motion of the
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the
guidelines." Id.
23. See Reynoso, 239 F.3d at 150.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part V.
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and by legislating mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug
crimes.
Part II of this Note provides the legal background of the safety
valve provision and related federal legislation. Part III addresses the
split in interpretation between federal circuits regarding the standard
of truthfulness required to obtain safety valve relief. Part IV describes
how the Reynoso court's interpretation of the safety valve transforms
the provision into a modified version of the substantial assistance
provision and the acceptance of responsibility provision. Part V
analyzes the effects of this new interpretation on judicial discretion in
sentencing, and Part VI provides concluding remarks about the
potential impact of the new interpretation.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are the result of the
Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA"), part of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984.26 Called a "sweeping ' 27 overhaul of federal
sentencing, the SRA "directed the promulgation of an essentially
mandatory system of federal sentencing." 28 Among reasons for the
enactment of the SRA, Congress indicated a desire to increase
certainty in sentence lengths,29 uniformity in sentencing among
similarly situated defendants, 30 and proportionality in sentencing.
31
26. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
27. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 65 (1983).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 103-460, at 3 (1994).
29. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 56; see also 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch.
1, pt. A3. An additional goal was to avoid offenders' receiving parole shortly after incarceration.
See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A3.
30. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52; see also 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at
ch. 1, pt. A3; see also ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 1-3, 6 (1974) (detailing a
study conducted prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act in which fifty federal district
court judges in the Second Circuit were given twenty identical case files and were asked to
indicate what sentence they would impose on each defendant, with the results indicating a wide
disparity in the sentences judges imposed). Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2000) provides:
(b) the purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to--
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system
that-(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code; (B) provide certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal
1270 [Vol. 56:1265
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Describing this last goal, the Senate Committee Report indicates that
use of the Guidelines "is intended to assure that each sentence is fair
compared to all other sentences.
32
As part of the SRA, Congress established the United States
Sentencing Commission, which was given a mandate to create the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.33  The Sentencing Guidelines
standardized sentencing in federal jurisdictions 34 and were designed
to further the goals enumerated in the SRA. 35 The Commission
drafted the Sentencing Guidelines to focus on relevant "offense"
characteristics. 36 This change represented a shift in emphasis from the
background of the particular offender to an emphasis both on the
offense itself and the particular offender's criminal history.
37
Accordingly, the Sentencing Guidelines determine an offender's
sentence based on a grid system: an offender's criminal history is on
one axis, and his offense level is on the other.38 A federal judge
determines an offender's sentencing range39 by starting with a certain
number of points for the offense itself, then by adding points based on
certain relevant aspects of the crime. 40 The judge next adjusts the
severity of the sentence within the range mandated by the Guidelines
based on the offender's criminal history. 41 Although the judge is
constrained by the limits of the sentencing range set by the
conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences
when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the
establishment of general sentencing practices.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2000).
32. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51; see also 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 1, pt.
A3.
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2000).
34. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch.1, pt. Al ("Introduction").
35. See 2002 SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM




38. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 1BI.1 ("Application Instructions")
(describing the steps to take in applying the Guidelines); see also James M. Anderson et al.,
Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 277 (1999) (describing the operation of the sentencing Guidelines "grid").
39. The sentencing range is from the lowest possible to the highest possible sentence a
defendant can receive.
40. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 1B1.1(b)-(e) (terming the underlying
offense the "base offense" and allowing for adjustments "as appropriate related to victim, role,
and obstruction of justice," as well as "defendant's acceptance of responsibility").
41. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 1B1.1(f) (instructing federal judges
to "[d]etermine the defendant's criminal history category as specified in Part A of Chapter
Four"); see also Anderson et al., supra note 38, at 278.
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Guidelines, she has broad discretion to determine a defendant's
sentence within the range.
42
Judges may depart from the sentencing range as calculated
under the Guidelines based on a series of aggravating and mitigating
factors. 43 The third section of the Sentencing Guidelines allows for
adjustments of an offender's sentence based on the following factors:
victim-related aspects of the offense, the defendant's role in the
offense, the defendant's level of cooperation with judicial proceedings,
and the number of counts of a crime of which the defendant has been
convicted. 44 These adjustments are called "downward departures"
because they allow a judge to "depart" from the sentencing ranges
proposed by the Guidelines.
B. Background Information on Mandatory Minimum Sentences
As part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress
enacted a host of new mandatory minimum sentences for drug and
firearm-related offenses. 45 Mandatory minimum penalties are enacted
by Congress and require a federal judge to impose a sentence of at
least a certain number of years when a defendant is convicted of a
particular federal crime. 46 A judge has discretion in deciding how
much higher the sentence should be but cannot go below the
statutorily prescribed minimum.
The history of mandatory minimum sentence legislation during
the last fifty years reveals conflicted and cyclical congressional
attitudes toward mandatory minimum sentences as criminal justice
policy.47 In 1951, Congress established mandatory minimum sentences
42. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5C1.1(a) ("A sentence conforms with
the guidelines for imprisonment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the
applicable guideline range."); see also Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion?
Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1058
(2001) ("Once a district court has determined the final offense level on the vertical axis and the
criminal history category on the horizontal axis, the Sentencing Table designates the sentencing
range. The judge retains effectively unfettered discretion to sentence within that range.")
(emphasis added).
43. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3A-D.
44. Id.
45. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 9 nn.26-29; see also Philip Oliss, Comment,
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63
U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1877-78 (1995) (noting that "Congress passed the mandatory minimum
statutes as a dramatic and popular way to combat some of the same perceived sentencing evils
that inspired the SRA").
46. See Michael M. Baylson, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: A Federal Prosecutor's
Viewpoint, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 167, 167 (1993).
47. See Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Editors' Observations, The Chasm Between the
Judiciary and Congress over Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 59 (1993)
1272 [Vol. 56:1265
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for drug-related crimes with the Boggs Act, an apparent response to
increased drug use by young Americans. 48 Congress then stiffened
minimum sentences for drug offenses in 1956.49 However, Congress
repealed most of these drug-related mandatory minimum penalties in
1970, 50 based on evidence from judges and prosecutors that mandatory
sentences were both unduly harsh and ineffective at deterring drug
crime.51 In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act, which included the Sentencing Reform Act, establishing the
United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate judicial
guidelines mandating uniformity in sentencing. 52 The Comprehensive
Crime Control Act also contained new mandatory minimum sentences
for drug and firearm offenses. 53 Congress cited renewed concern over
inconsistency in criminal sentences, unchecked judicial discretion, and
a desire for uniformity in sentencing among the reasons for its
enactment.5
4
C. The Intersection of the Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory
Minimum Sentence Legislation
Congress presented similar reasons for the enactment of the
Sentencing Reform Act and the enactment of additional mandatory
minimum sentences in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.55
Prominent among these rationales is a desire to achieve uniformity in
sentencing for similarly situated offenders. 56
(noting that in 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990, Congress passed laws requiring increasingly stiffer
mandatory minimum penalties), available at www.lexis.com (last visited Apr. 24, 2003).
48. See Oliss, supra note 45, at 1851.
49. Id. at 1851 n.7 (citing the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 651
(1956)).
50. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended in various sections of 21 U.S.C.). This Act repealed all
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses, except for continuing criminal enterprise
offenses. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2000).
51. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 7-8 nn.14-19; see also Oliss, supra note 45, at 1851-
52 (quoting then-Congressman George H.W. Bush describing the repeal as a move toward "better
justice and more appropriate sentences" (116 CONG. REC. 33, 314 (1970), reprinted in 3 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 108 (1990))).
52. See supra notes 26-28.
53. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 503(a), 1005(a), 98
Stat. 2069, 2138 (1984) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 860 (formerly § 845a) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
54. See supra notes 27-30.
55. See generally SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 35, 8-9; see also Jane L. Froyd, Comment,
Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1471, 1490 (2000) (noting that "both systems seek to provide appropriately severe and
certain punishment for serious criminal conduct").
56. See supra note 30; see also SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 25 ('The sentencing
guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences have in common important objectives. For
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1265
However, there is significant friction between the operation of
the Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences. 57 For
example, while the Guidelines tend to provide gradual increases in
sentence severity based on additional offenses or prior criminal
history, mandatory minimums result in markedly different sentences
for similarly situated defendants when one defendant meets the
requirements for the mandatory minimum sentence and another does
not. 58 The result of this so-called cliff effect is that a difference in drug
amount as small as five grams of cocaine can result in one defendant
receiving a sentence that is twice as long.
59
The substantial assistance provision, which provides an
exception to mandatory minimum sentences, also results in enormous
disparity in sentencing between similarly situated defendants based
on a defendant's ability and willingness to provide the government
with information about the underlying criminal activity. 60 The
substantial assistance provision allows judges to depart "downward"
example, both seek to provide appropriately severe and certain punishments for serious criminal
conduct.").
57. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 25 (providing that "[i]n numerous other respects,
however, mandatory minimums are both structurally and functionally at odds with sentencing
guidelines and the goals the sentencing guidelines seek to achieve"). Mandatory minimum
penalties operate to override the sentencing guidelines. See Celesta A. Albonetti, The Effects of
the "Safety Valve" Amendment on Length of Imprisonment for Cocaine
Trafficking/Manufacturing Offenders: Mitigating the Effects of Mandatory Minimum Penalties
and Offender's Ethnicity, 87 IOWA L. REV. 401, 405 (2002) (commenting that "[m]andatory
minimum penalties trump the sentencing guidelines"); see also Froyd, supra note 55, at 1484
(same).
58. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 25 ("Whereas the guidelines provide graduated,
proportional increases in sentence severity for additional misconduct or prior convictions,
mandatory minimums tend to result in sharp differentials or cliffs in sentences based upon small
differences in offense conduct or criminal record.").
59. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1970) (providing a minimum five-year penalty for the
manufacture or possession with intent to sell of one hundred grams or more of a substance
containing heroin), with § 841(b)(1)(A) (providing for a minimum ten-year penalty for one
kilogram or more of a substance containing heroin); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking
the Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 209 (1993) (arguing that the result of
the cliff effect is that "small drug quantities have enormous importance, while all other factors
bearing on culpability and dangerousness have no importance at all").
60. See Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 212 n.69 (quoting Judge Easterfield's opinion from
United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Mandatory minimum penalties,
combined with a power to grant exemptions, create a prospect of inverted sentencing. The more
serious the defendant's crimes, the lower the sentence-because the greater his wrongs, the more
information and assistance he has to offer to a prosecutor.")); see also Adriano Hrvatin,
Comment, Unconstitutional Exploitation of Delegated Authority: How to Deter Prosecutors from
Using "Substantial Assistance" to Defeat the Intent of the Federal Sentencing Laws, 32 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 117, 121 (2002) (arguing that "prosecutors violate separation-of-powers
principles when they move for downward departures on behalf of kingpins who provide
substantial assistance in a case against less culpable co-defendants because Congress did not
authorize such an exercise of prosecutorial discretion").
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from the mandatory minimum sentence. 61 Substantial assistance is
the primary reason for downward departures.62 For a defendant to
receive such a substantial assistance departure, she must provide the
government with information that is helpful to the investigation or
prosecution of others. 63 Moreover, the government must make a
motion to the court on behalf of the defendant, based on the useful
information that the defendant provided to the prosecution. 64
Obviously, the substantial assistance provision benefits those
persons most involved in the criminal activity who are able to provide
useful information to the government, such as names of contacts or
suppliers or information about the operation of the conspiracy. 65 The
useful information requirement deprives low-level offenders of any
way to reduce their mandatory minimum sentences. Even if they
cooperate with the government, they are often unable to provide
sufficient information to qualify for substantial assistance. This
"cooperation paradox" 66 is particularly acute in drug conspiracy cases
in which one or a few conspirators act as behind-the-scenes organizers
of the crime, employing others (usually drug addicts) to do the actual
drug handling and transacting. When the conspiracy is revealed, only
the organizers of the crime will be in a position to provide useful
information to the government, while the low-level participants
receive equally severe sentences based on the quantity of drugs
involved in the transaction. This cooperation paradox also has a
disparately harsh impact on women, who often serve as mules or
couriers in drug conspiracies. 67
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000),
62. In 2000, substantial assistance departures accounted for approximately three-quarters
of all departures that federal courts granted to crack and powder cocaine users. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 61
(2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/O2crackl2002crackrpt.htm; U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 38 (1997) (finding that in 1997, substantial assistance departures
accounted for approximately two-thirds of all departures that courts granted to drug offenders),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1997/97TOC.HTM; Bowman & Heise, supra note 42,
at 1110-11 (noting that "since 1994, roughly one in every three federal drug defendants has
received a substantial assistance departure").
63. See § 3553(e) ("Upon motion of the government, the court shall have the authority to
impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense.") (emphasis added).
64. § 3553(e).
65. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing.- No End to Disparity, 28
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 198-99 (1991).
66. See Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 211-13.
67. See Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African-American
Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 37 (1995); see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT tbl.5 (1997) (finding that women are convicted for drug offenses more
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D. Enactment of the Safety Valve Provision
Congress responded to the new drug-related mandatory
minimum sentences that were part of the SRA in 1984 in the same
way they had responded in 1970, after evidence showed that the
mandatory minimums were not achieving the intended goals of just
punishment, certainty, and fairness.68 In 1994, ten years after the
enactment of the SRA, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act, softening the effect of the SRA and the new
mandatory minimum sentences. 69
The safety valve provision is actually derived from two
separate acts. In 1994, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3553 by
creating the safety valve provision to address concerns that low-level,
nonviolent drug offenders were being unfairly punished by mandatory
minimum sentences when they shared only a small part in the
commission of the crime. 70 The Sentencing Commission enacted its
own safety valve in 1995, providing that a defendant who has an
offense level of twenty-six or greater and meets the other
requirements of the statute gains a two-level decrease in offense level
according to the Guidelines. 7' The Commission's safety valve applied
to all drug offenses, not merely the ones listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(f),72
and became effective for all defendants sentenced on or after
November 1, 1995. 73
frequently than any other type of offense), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1997/TABLE5.PDF.
68. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2000), with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); see also Albonetti, supra
note 57, at 407 (noting that "[1]egal scholars, social scientists, judges, and probation officers view
the safety valve amendment as a legislative attempt to mitigate the negative legal and sociolegal
ramifications of the harsh drug mandatory minimum sentences that went into effect in the mid-
1980s").
69. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1985 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553).
70. See supra Part II.D.
71. 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2Dl(b)(4) (1995) [hereinafter 1995
SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. This section has been rearranged so that § 2Dl(b)(4) is now
subsection (b)(6). 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2D1.1(b)(6).
72. The original five offenses are as follows: 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994) (prohibiting
manufacturing, distribution, or dispensation of real or counterfeit controlled substances); § 844
(prohibiting unlawful possession of controlled substances); § 846 (proscribing conspiracy to
commit drug-related offenses); § 960 (criminalizing importation or exportation of controlled
substances); § 963 (outlawing conspiracy to import or export controlled substances). See 1995
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5C1.2 (1995) (referring to these five code provisions).
73. 1995 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 70, §§ 5C1.2, 2Dl.l(a)(4); see also United
States v. Osei, 107 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that by locating the reduction in §
2D. 1, Congress conveyed its intention that the reduction should apply to all sentences, not just
to the mandatory minimum sentences enumerated in § 5C1.2).
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Until Congress enacted the safety valve provision in 1994,
defendants convicted of certain drug crimes could only receive less
than the mandatory minimum sentence based on substantial
assistance to the prosecutor. 74 In enacting the safety valve, Congress
specifically noted that the substantial assistance provision had the
result of rewarding more culpable defendants based on the amount of
useful information they could provide the prosecutor, while less
culpable defendants received the full mandatory minimum.7 5
Additionally, commentators such as Philip Oliss noted that the safety
valve, unlike the substantial assistance provision, limited
prosecutorial authority by allowing a judge, rather than a prosecutor,
to determine whether relief was warranted. 76 The safety valve's
legislative history demonstrates that Congress enacted the safety
valve to rectify these inequalities in the system:
Ironically, for the various offenders who most warrant proportionally lower sentences-
offenders that by guideline definitions are the least culpable-mandatory minimums
generally operate to block the sentence from reflecting mitigating factors.
7 7
The safety valve provides low-level offenders relief from
mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes if they meet specific
criteria. 78 The defendant must not have more than one criminal
history point,79 must not have used violence, threats of violence, or a
weapon during the offense, the offense must not have resulted in
death or serious bodily injury to another, and the defendant must not
be an organizer or leader in the offense. 0 Finally, no later than the
time of sentencing, the defendant must have "truthfully provided to
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000); 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5Kl.1.
75. H.R. Rep. No. 103-460 (1994), 1994 WL 107571; see also Schulhofer, supra note 59, at
211-13.
76. Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve,
and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1885-86 (1995):
Another aspect of the safety valve provision is that, while it does not eliminate
prosecutors' control over substantial assistance motions, it allows judges to determine
independently whether an offender has provided as much assistance as he or she is
capable of providing. If an offender has met the other criteria, and the judge is
satisfied that he or she has truthfully disclosed everything that he or she knows about
the offense, section 80001(a) instructs the judge to impose a sentence pursuant to the
guidelines. The fact that a defendant's knowledge may not be relevant or useful to the
prosecution is immaterial to the judge's determination. This provision does not affect
the prosecution's discretion regarding substantial assistance motions, but it appears
to limit the influence that prosecutorial discretion has in determining a first-time,
nonviolent offender's sentence.
Id.
77. H.R. REP. No. 103-460.
78. See § 3553(f).
79. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5C1.2(a)(1).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5) (2000).
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the government all information and evidence that the defendant has
concerning the offense."81
The purpose of the safety valve ostensibly is served by the
provision as enacted. The safety valve provision addresses the unjust
result of the substantial assistance provision whereby only the most
culpable defendants could obtain relief from mandatory minimum
sentences because they had the most information to offer the
government.8 2 Further, it makes a specific exception for first-time,
nonviolent offenders who fit certain criteria. In addition, relief is no
longer based on a prosecutorial motion.8 3 However, the text and
legislative history of the Act do not directly address the type of
truthfulness required by the safety valve provision. Does "truthfully"
providing "all the information that a defendant has"8 4 require that the
information provided be objectively truthful, or does the provision
provide relief for a defendant who truthfully believes that the
information she provides is true, when facts presented by the
government indicate that this believed information is not true?
III. THE SPLIT IN INTERPRETATION: THE STANDARD OF TRUTHFULNESS
REQUIRED TO QUALIFY FOR SAFETY VALVE RELIEF
In full, § 3553(f)(5) specifies that in order to qualify for safety
valve relief, the defendant must, by the time of sentencing, have
truthfully provided to the government all information and evidence that the defendant
has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of
a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful
other information to provide or that the government is already aware of the information
shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with
the requirement.
8 5
The language of the safety valve provision is inherently
ambiguous regarding the standard of truthfulness required to qualify
for relief. The Act uses the word "truth" in its adverbial form,
"truthfully. '8 6 The instant split of authority concerns whether the use
of the adverb form indicates that only a subjective standard of
truthfulness is sufficient (by focusing on the way in which the
81. § 3553(f)(5).
82. See supra notes 74-75.
83. See id.; see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcemant Act; Pub. L. No. 103-332, §
80001(a), 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553); Revisions to the Sentencing
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defendant provides the information), or whether, by using the word
"truthfully,"8 7 Congress intended that the defendant demonstrate that
the information he presents is objectively true. Closely related to the
issue of objective versus subjective truthfulness is the requirement
that a defendant provide "all information and evidence [he] has."8 8
Thus, truthfulness is measured by the court's perceptions of the extent
of the defendant's efforts to offer information within his possession.
A. The Background for the Reynoso Decision
As noted above, "truthfully provided" is a phrase with multiple
meanings. Since the enactment of the safety valve provision, federal
courts have taken different approaches to determining what conduct
by defendants will qualify for safety valve relief under the "truthfully
provided" language.8 9
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed
the specific issue of objective versus subjective truthfulness under the
safety valve provision in United States v. Thompson.90 In Thompson,
the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court determination that the
defendant qualified for safety valve relief because she provided
information to the government "within the range of her ability."91
A jury convicted Thompson of conspiracy to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute and of knowingly distributing cocaine, 92
based on a series of conversations and her delivery of the drugs to an
undercover officer. 93 Thompson admitted to counting sums of money
and delivering boxes and packages but challenged the jury's finding
that she was a knowing participant in the conspiracy, claiming that
although she was aware of the actions she was performing, she was
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Shebesta, Note, The "Safety Valve" Provision: Should the
Government Get an Automatic Shut-Off Valve?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 529, 531 (2002) (identifying
three main issues federal courts have encountered when interpreting the requirements of the
"truthfully provided" language in section 5C1.2):
First, should a defendant who initially lies to the government automatically be
disqualified from a safety valve reduction even if the defendant ultimately makes a
complete and truthful statement? Second, what is the statutory deadline for making a
complete and truthful statement to the government? Finally, how and to whom should
the safety valve statement be made?
90. 76 F.3d 166 (7th Cir. 1996).
91. Id. at 171.
92. Id. at 167-68. Thompson was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846 and of knowingly distributing approximately five kilograms
of cocaine under 841(a). Id.
93. Id. at 166-68.
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not aware of their implications or of their criminality.94 In her defense,
Thompson relied on a psychological profile that found that she
suffered from a diminished capacity to understand complex
situations. 95 Although the Seventh Circuit upheld the defendant's
conviction for knowing participation in the conspiracy, they also
upheld the application of the safety valve. 96 Because the district court
relied on expert testimony to hold that the defendant had provided
assistance to the government to the best of her abilities, 97 the Seventh
Circuit deferred to the district court's determination under the clearly
erroneous standard.98
Upholding the district court finding that the defendant had
provided all the information that she had "to the best of her ability,"
the Seventh Circuit upheld the application of safety valve relief.99 By
doing so, the Seventh Circuit accepted that safety valve relief applies
to defendants who provide information to the best of their abilities,
even if the information may not be objectively truthful.100 Although
the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the district court had evidence
indicating that Thompson was aware of the criminality of her actions,
the court held that Thompson's lack of ability to understand the
implications of those criminal actions did not preclude relief under the
safety valve.'0 1
Other circuits have indicated agreement with the Thompson
approach by reducing the emphasis on objective truthfulness in
94. Id. at 169. Thompson asserted that the "evidence introduced against her at trial
command[ed] nothing other than the innocent interpretation that these were the actions of a
secretary unwittingly performing the duties normally associated with that position, including
answering the phone, taking messages, and transferring items to customers as required by her
employer." Id.
95. Id. at 168.
96. Id. at 171.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 168-69. At sentencing, the district court, according to the Sentencing Guidelines,
recommended a decrease in her offense level based on her minimal role in the actual cocaine
distribution and gave her a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility based on the
psychological evaluation and the fact that Thompson gave information to the government "as she
knew and understood it." Id. at 168.
99. Id.
100. See id. It could be argued that, in making their decision, the Seventh Circuit was simply
deferring to the judgment of the district court under the clear error standard. However, the
Seventh Circuit specifically held that the defendant qualified for safety valve relief because she
was "forthright within the range of her ability." Id. at 171. Although this determination is reliant
on the district court finding, the Seventh Circuit was also interpreting the meaning of the
language of the safety valve requirement.
101. Id.
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awarding safety valve relief to defendants under the provision. 10 2 For
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a
jury's guilty verdict does not preclude a defendant from obtaining
safety valve relief.10 3 In United States v. Sherpa, the government
challenged the district court's finding on subsection (5) only-the
"truthfully provided" subsection of the safety valve provision. 104 A jury
had convicted Sherpa of possession of heroin with intent to distribute
and importation of heroin, notwithstanding his claim that he did not
know that the substance in his suitcase was heroin. 10 5 At sentencing,
the district court judge reduced Sherpa's sentence pursuant to the
safety valve.'0 6 On appeal, the government contended that Sherpa's
conviction for intent to distribute precluded the possibility that
Sherpa truthfully provided "all information" that he had concerning
the offense, arguing that "the jury's guilty verdict legally forecloses
any possibility that Sherpa's consistent profession of ignorance
(regarding the presence of drugs in the suitcase) was based in
truth."'1 7 The court disagreed, finding that "subsection (5) has been
termed a 'tell all you can tell' requirement" mandating only that
Sherpa provide all the information "at his disposal."'08
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit placed special emphasis on the
role of the judge over that of the jury in determining safety valve relief
under § 3553(f). 109 Because the judge is privy to far more information
than the jury in making a determination about sentencing relief,"0
she is in a better position to determine whether or not a particular
defendant has "truthfully provided" all the information that he has."'
The Sherpa court also based its position on the Supreme Court's
102. See, e.g., United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1999); United States
v. Sherpa, 110 F.3d 656, 663 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 939 (9th
Cir. 1996).
103. Sherpa, 110 F.3d at 663.
104. Id. at 660.
105. Id. at 658-59.
106. Id. at 659.
107. Id. at 660.
108. Id. (quoting United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1996)). A narrower
interpretation of this holding, that the holding was based solely on the reviewing court's ability
to sentence a defendant regardless of the findings of a jury, is discussed infra Part TV.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 660-61. As examples of the type of information a judge hears that a jury does not,
the Sherpa court provided: (1) statements made by a defendant who testified only at the
sentencing hearing, (2) evidence and witnesses not shown to the jury, and (3) an increased
opportunity to observe the defendant over a period of months. Id. at 660; see also United States
v. Fernandez-Vidana, 857 F.2d 673, 675 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that hearsay may be
considered at sentencing); FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (stating that rules of evidence do not apply at
sentencing).
111. Sherpa, 110 F.3d at 660-61.
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holding in United States v. Koon, stating that courts may not identify
facts relevant to sentencing beyond those delineated in the Sentencing
Guidelines. 112 According to Koon, "a federal court's examination of
whether a factor can ever be an appropriate basis for departure is
limited to determining whether the [Sentencing] Commission has
proscribed, as a categorical matter, consideration of the factor."113 In
light of the Koon decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court
may reconsider the facts necessary to the jury verdict in determining
whether or not a defendant should receive safety valve relief.
11 4
Therefore, if a defendant maintains his innocence to the judge at
sentencing after the jury has already decided his guilt as a matter of
fact, the sentencing judge has the discretion to award safety valve
relief based on elements of the crime, notwithstanding the difference
between the defendant's claim and the jury's finding.11 5 Obviously,
this holding grants judges increased discretion in determining
whether a defendant has been sufficiently truthful to qualify for safety
valve relief. The Sherpa holding demonstrates a general willingness to
allow defendants relief based on flexible standards of truthfulness as
determined by the reviewing court. The Sherpa court embraced this
flexible standard to the point of allowing the defendant to maintain a
position at sentencing in direct opposition to a fact established by the
jury.116
A decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
prior to Reynoso further demonstrates a flexible interpretation of the
truthfulness requirement of the safety valve provision. In United
States v. Schreiber, the Second Circuit held that a defendant who at
first lies and even misleads the government may still obtain safety
valve relief under § 3553(f), as long as the defendant eventually
provides information that complies with the safety valve requirements
at some time prior to his actual sentencing. 117 Defendant Schreiber
112. Id. at 661-62 (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)).
113. Koon, 518 U.S. at 109.
114. Sherpa, 110 F.3d at 662.
115. Id.
116. Although the Sherpa decision can be understood as merely increasing deference to
federal judges in sentencing, the Sherpa court simultaneously affirmed the defendant's right to
maintain a position in opposition to the prosecution at sentencing regarding the elements of the
safety valve requirement. Regarding judicial discretion and the safety valve, see discussion infra
Part V.
117. 191 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Shebesta, supra note 89, at 537-42 (describing
the Schreiber, Shrestha, and United States v. Tournier, 171 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 1999), decisions as
evidence of a "plain language interpretation" of the requirements of section 5C1.2(5) and arguing
that the statute does not distinguish between defendants who provide all information, or all
truthful information, in initial meetings and defendants who initially lie or mislead the
government but eventually provide adequate information before the sentencing hearing).
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repeatedly lied and obstructed the government's case prior to offering
two allegedly truthful 118 statements to the government before his
sentencing hearing.11 9 The district court denied the defendant's
request for safety valve relief, asserting that the defendant had
missed his chance to qualify by continually misleading the
government in earlier proffer sessions. 120 Based on a plain language
interpretation of § 3553(f) that a defendant must "truthfully provide[
]" the information "not later than the time of the sentencing
hearing,"1 21 the Second Circuit held that the defendant had satisfied
the basic requirements of the statute.1 22
In Schreiber, the Second Circuit also drew an important
distinction between a defendant's "cooperation" with the government
and the defendant's qualifications for safety valve relief.1 23 The court
remarked that "[t]o the extent that we have previously suggested that
the statute requires a defendant to 'cooperate' with the
government.., a defendant may meet the requirements by
volunteering to the government complete and truthful information no
later than the time of sentencing."124 In so holding, the Second Circuit
rejected the government's policy argument that a determination of
whether or not the defendant has acted in good faith should rest on
his "conduct as a whole," from the start of the criminal proceeding. 125
The Second Circuit described this government argument as an
attempt "to justify engrafting onto the statute the requirement that a
defendant must cooperate with the government in good faith even
beyond the textual mandate."126 According to the Second Circuit,
evidence regarding the defendant's conduct is relevant to the court's
determination of the defendant's credibility when he later claims
eligibility for safety valve relief, but prior lack of good faith in dealing
with the government does not automatically disqualify a defendant
from relief.1 27 The Schreiber court's holding is particularly interesting
in light of the subsequent Reynoso court's holding, because in
Schreiber, the Second Circuit demonstrated a general reluctance to
118. The court did not rule on the issue of truthfulness. The Second Circuit assumed that
defendant's final proffers were "complete and truthful." Schreiber, 191 F.3d at 106.
119. Id. at 103-05.
120. Id. at 106 (quoting the district court opinion declining to give defendant a "fourth bite at
the apple").
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (2000).
122. Schreiber, 191 F.3d at 106.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 106-07.
126. Id. at 106.
127. Id. at 107-08.
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correct problems inherent in the design of the safety valve.' 28 Noting
that the Schreiber interpretation of the safety valve may actually
encourage defendants to play games with the government, the Second
Circuit remarked that "[t]o the extent that this problem exists,
however, the remedy lies in Congress, not in a judicial rewrite of plain
text."1
29
However, the language that the Second Circuit used to describe
the safety valve in Schreiber laid the foundation for its future decision
in Reynoso. The court noted that to obtain safety valve relief, a
defendant must "volunteer[ ] to the government complete and truthful
information no later than the time of sentencing."'130 By ignoring the
statutory adverbial term "truthfully" in favor of the adjectival phrase
"truthful information," the Second Circuit laid the groundwork for
displacing a test of good-faith compliance with one of objectively
truthful information. 131 However, as previously discussed, the Reynoso
court's decision demonstrates that the two forms of the word are used
interchangeably in the application of the safety valve.
B. The Reynoso Court's Rationale
In Reynoso, the Second Circuit broke from traditional
interpretations of the safety valve-both from the "good-faith"
interpretation accepted by other circuits 132 and from the Second
Circuit's own plain language interpretation in Schreiber. The facts of
Reynoso are fairly straightforward. Defendant Reynoso approached a
confidential informant and handed him a brown bag that contained
forty-four grams of crack cocaine.' 33 Reynoso told the confidential
informant that there was crack cocaine in the bag.' 34 Reynoso was
arrested five months later and charged with conspiracy to distribute
128. Id. at 106.
129. Id. at 107.
130. Id. at 106.
131. See infra note 155 and accompanying text. Many courts of appeals use the terms
"truthful" and "truthfully" interchangeably when applying the safety valve. Id.
132. United States v. Reynoso, 239 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2000). Cases requiring the defendant to
make a "good-faith" effort include United States v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (requiring
that the defendant affirmatively cooperate with the government to receive safety valve relief),
United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring that the defendant initiate
contact and make attempts with the government to obtain safety valve relief), and United States
v. Ramunno, 133 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that a defendant who lies but later
admits some truth when confronted has not made a good-faith attempt and does not qualify for
safety valve relief); see also Shebesta, supra note 89, at 542-46 (describing the holdings in these
cases and the court's reasoning in each).
133. Reynoso, 239 F.3d at 144.
134. Id. at 144-45.
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and possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack
cocaine' 35 as well as with distribution and possession with intent to
distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine. 136 Reynoso met with
prosecutors for a safety valve proffer and informed the government
that she had been addicted to crack cocaine at the time of the drug
transfer. 37 Although Reynoso admitted that she had distributed the
crack cocaine on that occasion, she denied ever acting as a courier or
deliverer of drugs for a drug dealer and maintained that she had
stolen the crack and approached the confidential informant to sell it
on her own. 138 Her defense counsel admitted that the "objective facts
known to the parties did not support Ms. Reynoso's story .... [T]he
only logical inference [from the known facts] is that Ms. Reynoso was
working for a drug dealer as a courier, not that she had stolen the
crack and sold it herself."'139
Reynoso's counsel retained a forensic psychiatrist who found
that her "history of intoxication, impaired memory and neglect"
accounted for her behavior, even though she had no psychiatric
illness.' 40 The psychiatrist indicated that although Reynoso was ready
to accept responsibility for her criminal behavior, she was
unconsciously elaborating a story that would explain her behavior
based on the limited memory she had of the event.141 The doctor
indicated that Reynoso's story was untrue, but she did not appreciate
that it was untrue because of her "organic memory impairment,
secondary to cocaine intoxication."'142
Reynoso pled guilty, and defense counsel moved for safety valve
relief, conceding that Reynoso had not been "objectively" truthful at
her safety valve proffer, but arguing that because she "did not
appreciate the fact that her information was untrue [as a result] of
organic memory impairment," she nevertheless satisfied the
truthfulness requirement. 43
Before embarking on its analysis, the majority, following the
government's lead, accepted the findings of the psychiatrist who
interviewed the defendant and assumed that Reynoso subjectively
135. Id. at 145; see 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000).
136. Reynoso, 239 F.3d at 145; see §§ 812, 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B).
137. Reynoso, 239 F.3d at 145.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Appellant's Br. at 6).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The doctor also indicated that " 'such a pattern of confabulation is common in those




believed all the information that she provided to the government in
her safety valve proffer.144 The court then addressed both the
government's argument that Reynoso's information must be
objectively true to qualify and the defendant's argument that the
information need only be subjectively believed by the defendant.
145
The court concluded that both parties were partially correct, and that
both forms of truthfulness were required from the defendant. 146 The
Second Circuit indicated that "first and foremost" 147 the plain
language of § 3553(f)(5) supported this result.
148
The Court's textual arguments were twofold. First, the court
argued that the word "truthful" includes both a subjective and an
objective meaning.' 49 The court cited three dictionaries for the
proposition that the word "truthful" encompasses both "telling or
disposed to tell the truth"'150 (subjective truth) and "accurate and
sincere in describing reality" (objective truth).' 5' Based on these
definitions, the court reasoned that Congress intended for the word
"truthful" to require a defendant to offer information that is truthful
in both an objective and a subjective sense.
152
The court next addressed the defendant's argument that the
statute's phrasing and the use of the adverbial form, "truthfully
provided,"'153 indicates that the "emphasis of the statute is on the
defendant's state of mind."'5 4 Disregarding the emphasis on the
adverbial form, the court cited a long list of its own safety valve
opinions in which it employed the words "truthful" and "truthfully"
interchangeably, demonstrating that no special import was intended
by the use of the adverbial form.155
144. Id. at 145 n.2.




149. Id. at 147.
150. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2457 (1976)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (2000).
154. Reynoso, 239 F.3d at 147.
155. Id. at 147-48 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that § 3553(f)(5) requires that a defendant provide "to the government complete
and truthful information no later than the time of sentencing"); United States v. Conde, 178 F.3d
616, 620 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that § 3553(f)(5) requires "truthful and complete disclosure to the
government"); United States v. Smith, 174 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that safety valve
relief is contingent on disclosure of "complete and truthful information"); United States v. Cruz,
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The court also offered legislative history to support its
opinion. 156 The court reviewed Congress's purpose in enacting the
safety valve: to rectify an inequity in the system whereby low-level
offenders who wanted to cooperate with the government were denied
relief from mandatory minimum sentences because they had no new
information to offer. 157 The court interpreted this congressional
language to mean that the safety valve extends only to defendants
who would have qualified under the substantial assistance provision
but for the requirement that they provide new and/or useful
information to the government.158 Therefore, to qualify for safety valve
relief, a low-level, first-time offender must have the same state of
mind as a more culpable defendant who is attempting to qualify for a
substantial assistance downward departure. 159 The court continued
this line of analysis to read the statute as providing that "the
government is entitled under § 3553(f)(5) not to be provided with
objectively false information, which may be harmful to the
government."'160 The court concluded its analysis of the legislative
history by expressing confidence that "Congress did not intend to
reward the defendant who, for whatever reason, tries 'to trade' on
objectively false information."'16 1
The Second Circuit next addressed the two arguments raised
by Reynoso in her appeal. 62 Reynoso first argued that the safety valve
has been interpreted by other courts of appeals as a "good-faith"
provision requiring a defendant only to make a showing of a "good-
faith" effort to cooperate with the government. 63  The court
acknowledged the good-faith interpretation of the safety valve, but
stated that "we have never suggested that whether a defendant
satisfies the statutory requirement.., turns solely on the defendant's
state of mind."'6 4
156 F.3d 366, 371 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that § 3553(f)(5) requires "that a defendant provide
truthful information regarding the 'offense of conviction and all relevant conduct' ')).







163. Id. at 149 (citing Appellant's Br. at 22 (citing United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935,





The defendant then attempted to draw a parallel between her
case and the Sherpa and Thompson courts' holdings. 165 The Reynoso
court found Sherpa inapplicable to the instant case, concluding that
Sherpa only addressed the issue of whether a sentencing court could
consider all of the facts relevant to the jury's decision in determining
sentencing.166 The court then distinguished Thompson on the grounds
that the defendant provided statements regarding her objective
conduct. 167 The court found that to the extent that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit evaluated Thompson's psychological
testimony, they did so only to determine whether Thompson had
provided all of the information that she had, not to determine whether
the information she had provided was objectively truthful.168
In dissent Judge Calabresi offered a different interpretation of
the safety valve based on the language of the provision, case law
interpreting the safety valve, and the relevant legislative history. 16 9
Judge Calabresi stated that by using the adverbial form of truthful,
"truthfully," Congress intended specific emphasis on the manner that
the defendant provided information rather than on the substance of
the information provided. 170 He argued that the determination of
whether a defendant "truthfully" provided information should be
based on the defendant's state of mind17' and cited Second Circuit
language terming the safety valve a "good faith attempt to cooperate
with the authorities" as support for this interpretation. 172 Further,
Judge Calabresi noted that the plain language of the statute only
requires that a defendant provide all of the information that she
"has."'173 If the Reynoso court already found that defendant Reynoso
did not "have" the information because of a psychological impairment,
there is no way that she could have provided that information to the
government. 174
Judge Calabresi further indicated that the Second Circuit's
past interchangeable use of the words "truthful" and "truthfully" did
not indicate that the two have interchangeable meanings. 75 Instead,
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 166, 171 (7th Cir. 1996)).
168. Id. (citing Thompson, 76 F.3d at 171).
169. Id. at 150 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 150-51 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 150 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105,
1110 (2d Cir. 1997)).
173. Id. at 150-51 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (2000)).
175. Id. at 151 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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he argued the language cited by the majority is irrelevant, because
when the court used "truthful" and "truthfully" interchangeably, it
was never addressing the specific standard of truthfulness necessary
to gain safety valve relief.1 76
Addressing the majority's analysis of the legislative history,
Judge Calabresi found the history largely inconclusive, but remarked
that, "if anything, it cuts against the majority view."'177 Because the
safety valve was enacted to benefit defendants even if they had no new
or useful information to trade with the government, it follows that the
defendant may be eligible for safety valve relief "regardless of whether
they have useful knowledge, useless knowledge, wrong knowledge, or
no knowledge at all."178
Finally, Judge Calabresi addressed the fear that he believes
underlies the majority's opinion: that defendants will gain relief by
"trading on" false information.' 79 According to Judge Calabresi, the
majority was afraid that allowing the defendant to offer information
that is only subjectively truthful would lead to a battle of the experts,
making it more difficult for courts to determine the facts.1 80 Judge
Calabresi observed that courts already engage in credibility
determinations when they weigh evidence to determine whether to
grant safety valve relief' 8 1 In addition, he opined that the majority's
holding would encourage defendants to provide less information to the
government than they otherwise might, because if they were unable to
prove that the information was objectively truthful or if the
government had contradictory information, the contested additional
information they provide would potentially cast doubt on the quality of
the original information provided.'8 2 Thus, the majority's holding
creates a "perverse incentive to deny knowledge of uncomfortable
facts."
8 3
Judge Calabresi's dissent proposes a new way to address
standards of truthfulness in applying the safety valve. 8 4 Judge
176. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 153 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 154 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.
1999), and United States v. Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105, 1110 (2d Cir. 1997)) (describing how the
district court based its denial of safety valve relief on the "detailed representations in the
government's letter, which the court credited over [defendant's] implausible arguments in
rebuttal").
182. Id. at 154 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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Calabresi suggests that courts employ an "overwhelmingly strong
presumption" that the defendant is not providing subjectively truthful
information when the information given is not objectively truthful.18 5
Such a presumption would make it much harder to "trade on" false
information and would restrict relief for the defendant to the rare
cases in which the government accepts that the defendant subjectively
believes the information she is able to provide. 8 6 Judge Calabresi
observed that operating under a strong presumption that what is
subjectively believed is objectively truthful is not unusual in criminal
law.187 Judge Calabresi declined to suggest that the information
Reynoso proffered was sufficient to carry her burden of proof, but
nevertheless dissented from the majority opinion because the
government "conceded that Reynoso believed she was telling the
truth."88
Indeed, the most curious aspect of the Reynoso court's decision
is the fact that both the court majority and the government accepted
that the defendant provided all the information that she had, 8 9 but
concluded that the information provided was insufficient. 90 The
majority seemed to overlook the language directly following the word
"truthfully" in the statute-that the defendant must provide "all the
information" that she "has."' 9' Taking these two phrases together, it is
natural to assume that "truthfully" governs the way in which the
defendant must provide the information, while "all the information"
the defendant "has" governs the type and amount of information that
the defendant must provide. However, this inference does not mean
that "truthfully" cannot also modify the type of information that the
defendant provides.
While interchangeable use by courts of appeals of the adjective
"truthful" and the adverb "truthfully" indicates that courts often do
185. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 154-55. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 155. (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Judge Calabresi included a colorful example to
illustrate this point:
A defendant who truly believes that that which she held to the head of her victim was
a banana and not a gun has a defense, based on an absence of mens rea, to a charge of
murder or criminal assault. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible ... for a defendant
to demonstrate the truth of that assertion because we assume ... that everybody
knows the difference between a gun and a banana.
Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 146 n.2 (noting that "for purposes of this appeal we assume, as did the district
court, that Reynoso subjectively believed that she has truthfully provided all the information she
had").
190. Id. at 150.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (2000).
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not meaningfully distinguish between the two forms of the word, it
also points to the wide variety of types and forms of truth present in
any judicial proceeding. To the defendant who subjectively holds a
belief, there is no discernable difference between objective and
subjective truthfulness. There is only one "truth" that he knows.
Therefore, the defense's closest approximation to objectively truthful
information is to present the testimony of a psychiatrist who will
explain differences between what appears to be the objective truth
(i.e., corroborated testimony by the prosecution) and the truth offered
by the defendant. By doing so, the defense seeks to show that although
the defendant is not providing objective truth, she is making a good-
faith attempt to provide what she can. The prosecution is in the same
position of providing their necessarily subjective allegations about
what occurred and offering testimony of witnesses to bolster these
allegations. Because the judge will determine how objectively truthful
each side has been by evaluating all the evidence they have presented,
the prosecution only will offer such evidence that it can prove so as not
to call attention to loose ends or conflicting details. However, when the
defendant uses a psychiatrist to demonstrate that his version of the
truth is bona fide, she calls the whole of his testimony into question. If
a defendant has some information to give the government but is
unable to prove that other portions of his testimony are objectively
true, he may be unable to qualify for the safety valve under the
Reynoso standard.
The standard of truthfulness required for a defendant to
qualify for safety valve relief at a sentencing hearing is extremely
important when viewed in the broader context of criminal procedure.
The sentencing hearing is typically the only hearing that a defendant
receives pursuant to a plea agreement. 192 Because truthfulness is
determined by the court based on a variety of factors not included in
the text of the opinion, including the defendant's demeanor, attitude,
and other background information to which only the court has access,
it often will be difficult on appeal to determine which aspects of the
defendant's testimony were most central to the court's decision to
award or deny relief. The safety valve already provides judges
considerable discretion based largely on the language of the
truthfulness requirement. 193 In a broader sense, the safety valve
192. Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 161, 170 (1991) (finding that, of four selected districts in the year of 1989, seventy-
nine percent of all defendants pled guilty to drug crimes).
193. See, e.g., Albonetti, supra note 57, at 419 (noting that "three of the five conditions
required to qualify for the safety valve provision are salient defendant characteristics used in the
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represents a departure from the stated purposes of the Guidelines
because it requires courts to examine the particular characteristics of
the offender, as opposed to focusing solely on the offense.
194
Understood in this light, the Reynoso court's decision can be
interpreted as an effort to rein in judicial discretion in determining
whether or not a defendant qualifies for safety valve relief.
IV. ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT: THE SAFETY VALVE AND THE
ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
The Second Circuit in Reynoso grafted an additional
requirement onto the safety valve provision by requiring that a
defendant prove that the information he provides is both subjectively
and objectively truthful. This additional truthfulness requirement
draws heavily from the requirements for downward departures, 19
5
including the departure for "acceptance of responsibility"1 96 and the
departure for "substantial assistance" to the government. 197 As such,
the Reynoso court's decision represents an expansion in the
interpretation of the safety valve provision.
Following the enactment of the safety valve legislation, federal
courts confronted a wide range of procedural issues concerning how a
defendant must deliver any information he has to qualify for safety
valve relief.' 98 These initial cases analyzing safety valve qualifications
also demonstrate the difficulty that federal courts face in
distinguishing the operation of the safety valve provision from the
acceptance of responsibility and substantial assistance provisions.
For example, in United States v. Ivester, the Fourth Circuit
held that the defendant must initiate contact with the government to
qualify for safety valve relief.1 99 Addressing this specific issue for the
causal attribution decisionmaking process that judges relied on prior to federal Guidelines
reform and the era of mandatory minimum sentences") (citations omitted).
194. See id.
195. Downward departures provide an opportunity for a defendant to receive a lesser
sentence under the Guidelines, while the safety valve provides defendants a way out of
mandatory minimum sentences. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000).
196. 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3E1.1. The "acceptance of responsibility"
departure, found in section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines, allows a defendant to receive a reduction in
his Guideline-determined sentence if he "truthfully admits the conduct comprising the offense(s)
of conviction." Id,
197. 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5K1.1. The "substantial assistance"
provision allows, upon government motion, a defendant to receive a departure below the
statutory minimum if he provides "useful information" to the government. Id.
198. See Shebesta, supra note 89, at 531.
199. 75 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 1996).
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first time, the court held that the language requiring a defendant to
"truthfully provide to the government all information ... concerning
the offense"200 is "plain and unambiguous" and that it requires a
defendant to "demonstrate, through affirmative conduct, that they
have supplied truthful information to the government."20 1 This
"affirmative act" requirement bears a strong resemblance to the
conduct required by a defendant to qualify for substantial assistance,
which basically requires defendants to "turn" on their codefendants
and take sides with the government. 20 2 Indeed, defendant Ivester
argued that this interpretation required defendants to act like
government informants and, as such, was contrary to the statutory
language, which specifically does not require any new or useful
information from the defendant in order to qualify for relief.20 3 In
dissent, Judge Hall noted that the majority had construed the word
"provide" (as in, the defendant must "truthfully provide"20 4) to require
the defendant to do more than simply tell what he knows. 20 5 Although
he acknowledged that the statute requires the defendant to perform
an "affirmative act" to qualify for relief, he argued that a defendant
may commit such an act simply by opening his mouth and should not
also be required to arrange a meeting with the government. 20 6 Most
courts of appeals have sided with the Fourth Circuit and require a
defendant to seek out the government to qualify for relief under the
safety valve. 20
7
200. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (2000).
201. Ivester, 75 F.3d at 185.
202. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5K1.1; see also Frank 0. Bowman,
III, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on "Substantial Assistance"
Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 57 (1999)
(describing the effect of the substantial assistance provision on defendants).
203. Ivester, 75 F.3d at 185.
204. § 3553(f)(5).
205. Ivester, 75 F.3d at 186-87 (Hall, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 186 (Hall, J., dissenting).
207. See United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that, in arguing
for the application of the safety valve, a defendant may not claim that the government did not
affirmatively seek information from the defendant); United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 148
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the safety valve requirement was intended to benefit "only those
defendants who truly cooperate" and that true cooperation requires a "good-faith attempt" to
cooperate with the authorities). In addition, most federal courts have followed the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits' approach by requiring the defendant to provide complete information regarding
the names (or descriptions) of the person or people who gave him the drugs. See, e.g., United
States v. Camacho, 261 F.3d 1071, 1073 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 124-
25 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Romo, 81 F.3d 84, 85 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Acosta-
Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 379 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 143 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995). This requirement is intuitive because
such low-level offenders often have little other information to offer. See United States v.
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Once the defendant offers his information to the government,
what is the government's role in determining its truthfulness? Section
5C1.2(5) provides that the defendant must "truthfully provide[ ] to the
government all information and evidence," but then states that the
court is not precluded from awarding safety valve relief when the
defendant has not provided any new or useful information. 208 As a
result, on the rule's face, it appears that the government is in the
position to determine truthfulness, while the court is in the position of
determining whether or not the information is new or useful. This
provision reverses the roles: the government is in the better position to
determine whether the information is new and useful (and also to
argue as to its truthfulness), but the court is in the best position to
make a ruling on the truthfulness of the defendant. Federal safety
valve opinions reflect confusion regarding the degree of deference to be
afforded government assessments of a defendant's credibility in
applying the safety valve, especially given the precedent of granting
significant deference to the government in determining whether or not
to bring a motion for substantial assistance. 20 9 As noted above, the
major difference between substantial assistance and the safety valve
is that substantial assistance requires a motion from the government
for the court to consider a substantial assistance departure, while the
safety valve provision does not.210  Courts have identified the
differences between the provisions to emphasize the court's role in
determining truthfulness: for example, in United States v. Maduka,
the Sixth Circuit held that the safety valve only requires a defendant
to provide the information that she possesses, regardless of its
helpfulness to the government. 21' Refining the Ivester court's definition
of the discretionary role a court plays in determining whether a
defendant qualifies, the Sixth Circuit remarked that while a court
reviewing a substantial assistance motion "must grant 'substantial
weight' to the evaluation by the government of the assistance
rendered by a defendant.... a court independently reviews the
applicability of § 5C1.2." 21 2 Following suit, in United States v.
Espinoza, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded a district court
opinion that relied only on the government's information and
Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that 'lower-level offenders, such as drug
couriers or 'mules,' ... typically have less [criminal] knowledge").
208. § 3553(f)(5).
209. See Ivester, 75 F.3d at 185; United States v. Maduka, 104 F.3d 891, 894 (6th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Thompson, 81 F.3d 877, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1996); Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 379.
210. See supra note 63; see also Ivester, 75 F.3d at 185.
211. 104 F.3d 891, 894-95 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Thompson, 81 F.3d at 881.
212. Maduka, 104 F.3d at 895.
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disregarded the defendant's position because he had not testified at
trial, holding the court responsible for determining the "truthfulness
of the information the defendant provided to the government."
213
Courts of appeals have also distinguished safety valve relief
from downward departures for acceptance of responsibility based on
the defendant's timing in cooperating with the government. In United
States v. Shrestha, the court held that a defendant still qualified for
safety valve relief even if she initially presented truthful information
but then subsequently pled not guilty and denied what she had
previously stated.214 Drawing a sharp distinction between the
acceptance of responsibility provision and the safety valve provision,
the court held that the safety valve is "not concerned with sparing the
government the trouble of preparing for and proceeding with trial....
[It] was designed to allow the sentencing court to disregard the
statutory minimum in sentencing first-time nonviolent drug offenders
who played a minor role in the offense and who 'have made a good-
faith effort to cooperate with the government.' "215 Similarly, in
Schreiber, the Second Circuit held that a defendant who at first lied
and misled the government and refused to attend a proffer session
was not ineligible for safety valve relief under § 3553(f).216 However,
the Second Circuit declined to stretch the safety valve's "good-faith"
requirement to extend to the defendant's entire conduct from the start
of the criminal proceeding and held that inconsistencies in a
defendant's story would weigh heavily against her credibility. 2
17
However, the Second Circuit held that the court should not place any
additional requirements on the defendant beyond those mandated by
the plain letter of the law.218
Legal commentators have noted federal courts' tendency to
read and interpret the safety valve provision within the context of the
purpose and rationale of substantial assistance and other Guidelines
departures. 219 According to Jane Froyd, courts have difficulty applying
the safety valve provision because it was modeled after the substantial
assistance provision 220 but is based on a different rationale. 221 The
213. 172 F.3d 795, 796-97 (11th Cir. 1999).
214. 86 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1996).
215. Id. (citation omitted).
216. United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999).
217. Id. at 107.
218. Id. at 108.
219. See Virginia G. Villa, Retooling Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Fixing the Federal
"Statutory Safety Valve" to Act as an Effective Mechanism for Clemency in Appropriate Cases, 21
HAMLINE L. REV. 109, 124 (1997); Froyd, supra note 55, at 1499 (noting that "Congress modeled
[the truthfulness] requirement after the downward departure for substantial assistance").
220. See Froyd, supra note 55, at 1499; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000).
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safety valve provision is based on the "relative culpability or ranking
of drug offenders,"222 while the substantial assistance provision is
based on a desire to obtain cooperation from defendants who have
useful information to offer the government in exchange for a reduced
sentence. 223 As such, the Reynoso court's focus on obtaining objectively
truthful information places undue emphasis on the usefulness of that
information to the government, rather than on the defendant's actions
in making the statement. 224 Virginia Villa also notes that the safety
valve provision "allows a low-level offender who has no valuable
information to seek the same type of 'deal' available to upper-level
offenders [under the substantial assistance provision] ."225 According to
Villa, given courts' "previous practice [of applying the substantial
assistance provision] and the language of the statute, it is not
surprising that courts have construed the statutory safety valve as
narrowly as the substantial assistance provision."226
Although the safety valve differs fundamentally from the
downward departures in that it applies solely to first-time, low-level
offenders, 227 federal courts have had difficulty distinguishing the
nature of the safety valve's truthfulness requirement from the
truthfulness required for the substantial assistance and acceptance of
responsibility downward departures. The Reynoso court's decision is a
substantive return to a requirement that a defendant provide the
government with useful information to qualify for relief from
mandatory minimum sentencing. By interpreting the statutory
language to mean that the government is required to receive
objectively true information under the safety valve requirement, 228 the
221. Froyd, supra note 55, at 1499.
222. Id.
223. Id.; see also § 3553(e); 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5K1.1; see also
Froyd, supra note 55, at 1499:
The only role that culpability plays in [the substantial assistance] provision is that
highly culpable offenders are usually better able to take advantage of this departure.
But it is their knowledge of criminal activity, rather than their level of culpability,
that actually allows them to take advantage of this departure.
However, it may be argued that in drug cases where intent is a key issue, knowledge of criminal
activity is a proxy for culpability.
224. Indeed, the fact that the "truthfully provided" requirement is preceded by four
requirements that are only concerned with the culpability of the defendant (his prior criminal
history, whether or not the crime was violent, etc.) provides support for the understanding that
the safety valve is concerned with the defendant's situation, not necessarily with the usefulness
of the information he provides. See 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5C1.2.
225. Villa, supra note 219, at 124.
226. Id.
227. See § 3553(f).
228. United States v. Reynoso, 239 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Reynoso court placed renewed emphasis on the value of the
information to the government-and on whether or not the
government will be able use the information. Fear that defendants
would intentionally mislead the government by offering false
information was a major rationale underlying Congress's decision to
vest the power to bring motions for departures based on substantial
assistance in the executive branch. However, the same rationale
should not apply to defendants who typically have no new or useful
information to provide. 229 The language of the safety valve specifically
avoids emphasis upon benefit to the government.
230
V. JUDICIAL DISCRETION: EFFECTS OF REYNOSO ON JUDICIAL
SENTENCING UNDER THE FEDERAL GUIDELINES
As discussed above, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the
subsequent Federal Sentencing Guidelines came about in response to
concerns that the prior rehabilitative approach to sentencing, which
focused on particular characteristics of the offender, was not
working, 231 and that similarly situated defendants were receiving
disparate sentences because of broad judicial discretion. 23
2
Legal scholars have examined the effect of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and mitigating statutes including the safety
valve on actual federal drug crime sentencing. 233 For example,
Professors Bowman and Heise found that the enactment of the initial
congressional safety valve had little impact on drug sentences. 23
4
However, after the Sentencing Commission's two-level safety valve
was made effective in November 1, 1995, there was a "significant
reduction" in drug sentences:235
In 1996, the percentage of drug cases receiving either a statutory or Guidelines safety
valve reduction totaled 19.2%. And in 1996, [Administrative Office of the United States
Courts] sentencing figures show a dramatic drop in average drug sentence (from 88.7
months in 1995 to 82.5 months in 1996) and the [United States Sentencing] Commission
229. See § 3553(f)(5).
230. See § 3553(f)(5).
231. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 42, at 1054-55 (explaining that in the 1970s and
1980s, the rehabilitative model of sentencing lost sway in state and federal courts for many
reasons, including rising crime, evidence that prisoners were not being rehabilitated, and
disparate sentences for similarly situated defendants).
232. Id. at 1055.
233. See id. at 1049, supra note 42 (concluding that at least some decrease in length of
federal drug sentences is attributable to "non-discretionary" causes); see also Frank 0. Bowman,
III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II. An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug
Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 480-81 (2002).
234. Bowman & Heise, supra note 42, at 1071.
235. Id.
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reported a two-month decrease from the preceding year (from 86.6 months in 1995 to
84.3 months in 1996).236
However, Bowman does not believe that the enactment of the
safety valve is responsible for this decline in federal drug
sentencing. 237 His research indicates a downward trend in sentence
lengths starting in 1992, before the safety valve was enacted.238 The
safety valve was the only provision enacted after 1990 providing
defendants with relief from mandatory drug sentences, but Bowman
argues that it is likely not responsible for the decline in actual drug
crime sentences during the 1990s. 239
Bowman believes that increases in discretionary factors, such
as judges' ability to sentence individuals within the sentencing range,
are the real cause of the gradual decreases in sentence lengths. 240
Although the safety valve appears to be based on nondiscretionary
factors, such as the defendant's criminal history, the nonviolent
nature of the crime, and the requirement that the defendant not be
leader of the criminal activity to qualify, 241 Bowman argues that the
"five qualifying criteria clearly leave room for hidden or overt
exercises of discretion. '' 242
Although application of the safety valve is ostensibly
mandatory if the defendant meets the five criteria, federal judges have
considerable discretion in determining whether or not the criteria
have been met. As the vaguest of the five requirements, the
236. Id. at 1071-72 (citations omitted).
237. Id. at 1072.
238. Id.; see also Bowman & Heise, supra note 233, at 480-81:
[T]he evidence we have reviewed shows the following: (1) at virtually every point in
the Guidelines sentencing process where prosecutors and judges can exercise
discretionary authority to reduce drug sentences, they have done so; and (2) where we
can measure trends, the trend since roughly 1992 has always been toward exercising
discretion in favor of leniency with increasing frequency.
Id.
239. Bowman & Heise, supra note 42, at 1072.
240. Id.
241. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000).
242. Bowman & Heise, supra note 42, at 1072; see also Bowman & Heise, supra note 233, at
490-91:
[T]he true significance [of the statutory safety valve] is that for eligible first-time
offenders it opens the door to an array of discretionary choices previously foreclosed to
lawyers and judges by operation of the mandatory minimum sentence statutes ....
[Such] ... wholly or partly discretionary mitigating guidelines provisions ...
[include] ... non-substantial assistance departures and reductions for mitigating role
in the offense.
Id. (citations omitted).
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truthfulness requirement offers a significant potential for the exercise
of such discretion.
243
In one respect, the Reynoso court's decision was an attempt to
diminish judicial discretion in determining whether or not a defendant
qualifies for safety valve relief. By injecting an objective standard of
truthfulness into the test, the Reynoso decision partially standardizes
the process by which courts determine a defendant's truthfulness. The
Second Circuit no longer must consider a defendant's subjective beliefs
if he cannot prove their objective truthfulness.
An unintended result of Reynoso may be that defendants are
less likely to come forward with information that they cannot verify.
As noted above, at the sentencing hearing, the defendant has the
burden of proving that he qualifies for safety valve relief. The
prosecution, in turn, may present evidence tending to show that the
defendant should not receive safety valve relief. Because many safety
valve cases involve drug conspiracies, the prosecution is likely to be in
the process of indicting a series of defendants connected to the same
criminal activity and also is likely to have considerably more
information about the conspiracy as a whole than the defendant. At
the sentencing hearing, the defendant will attempt to prove she has
given all of the information that she knows by presenting evidence of
her minimal involvement in the criminal activity. If the government
has contrasting information from other members of the conspiracy, it
will attempt to discredit the defendant's claim that she lacks such
knowledge. It will be difficult for the defendant to overcome these
attempts by the government, however, because the defendant typically
has little or no information regarding the other criminal actors in the
conspiracy, especially if she acted only as a "mule," or courier of drugs.
In this situation, the judge has little "objective" basis on which to
determine the defendant's truthfulness. Because of the defendant's
minimal role in the criminal activity and the heavy burden of
demonstrating his truthfulness, the defendant's fate will hinge on the
judge's general impressions of the defendant's credibility.
An example of this scenario is United States v. Hicks, a decision
in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the
Reynoso approach. 244 In Hicks, the Sixth Circuit employed Reynoso
language that "a defendant seeking to qualify for relief under the
safety valve provision must prove both that the information he or she
243. Bowman & Heise, supra note 42, at 1073 ("A determination of whether the defendant
has provided truthful and complete disclosure rests largely on a necessarily imprecise and
largely unverifiable assessment by the prosecutor of the veracity and completeness of a
defendant's post-plea-agreement debriefing.").
244. Nos. 99-6457/99-6458, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 10758, at *7 (6th Cir. May 15, 2001).
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provided to the government was objectively true and that he or she
subjectively believed that such information was true."245 The Hicks
court upheld the district court finding that because there was a large
discrepancy between the information that defendant Hicks admitted
and the amount of information that was supported by the evidence,
Hicks had not been "truthful with the court in describing the
transactions which form[ed] the relevant conduct." 246 Faced with this
typical scenario, judges will be more likely to deny safety valve relief
based on "gaps" in a defendant's knowledge.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Reynoso court's decision represents a shift from a more
flexible "good-faith" interpretation of the safety valve toward a stricter
standard that defendants must meet to qualify for reduced sentences.
This shift is not supported by the plain language of the statute
as enacted, which requires only that a defendant provide all of the
information that she has. 247 To the extent that the information a
defendant provides is discredited by the information the government
provides, a judge has discretion to determine what she thinks is
truthful. However, the decision in Reynoso goes beyond an increase in
judicial discretion. Although the Second Circuit agreed that the
defendant had provided all of the information that she could, it still
denied her relief because her version of events did not match the
objective facts. If the court had disregarded her testimony or if the
government had successfully discredited it, the decision would be far
less significant. However, because the court accepted the testimony,
the court effectively denied safety valve relief to a defendant who had
provided all the information she had regarding her crime. This result
is in direct contrast to Congress's express purpose in enacting the
provision.
Although many federal courts that have not adopted the
Reynoso court's approach likely already consider objective truth in
deciding whether or not to grant a defendant safety valve relief, the
Reynoso court goes too far by refusing relief to a defendant who
subjectively believes objectively untruthful information. Where the
court, having weighed the evidence, agrees that a defendant believes
the subjective information she presents, a defendant should not be
denied relief because the information is ultimately unhelpful to the
245. Id. at *10-11.
246. Id.; see also United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 124 (6th Cir. 1996).
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (2000); 2002 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5C1.2.
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government. By placing renewed emphasis on the importance of the
government receiving truthful information, 248 the Second Circuit
effectively denies relief to low-level defendants with a shaky grasp on
reality, those who are most attractive to high-level offenders looking
for vulnerable agents and who are therefore most in need of safety
valve relief. 249
Molly N. Van Etten°
245. See United States v. Reynoso, 239 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that "the government
is entitled under § 3553(f)(5) not to be provided with objectively false information, which may
well be harmful to the government") (emphasis in original).
249. Often, these first-time offenders are women, girlfriends, or drug addicts who are
dependent upon the main offender. See Johnson, supra note 67, at 45. Thompson and Reynoso
are both female. United States v. Reynoso, 239 F. 3d 143, 144 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v.
Thompson, 76 F. 3d 166, 167 (7th Cir. 1996).
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